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From losses to about 10% net margin for a pre-owned electronics retailer

Case study · E-commerce · Business transformation

A six-week diagnosis traced a pre-owned electronics retailer’s sales decline to lost customer trust. Embedded delivery followed, and the year closed at about $9M in revenue and about 10% net margin.

Client
A pre-owned consumer electronics retailer selling online and on marketplaces, with 44 staff
Engagement
Diagnosis and transformation strategy in six weeks from August 2024, a project portfolio by the end of November 2024, and an interim management mandate
Result
FY2024 closed at about $9M in revenue, with net margin at about 10% after loss-making months in July and August
How we worked
Embedded across every department, anchored to revenue and margin, and sequenced by impact against effort

Published . Client name withheld.

10%Approximate net margin at FY2024 close, up from loss-making months

The situation

A pre-owned consumer electronics retailer selling online and on marketplaces had grown fast from a standing start. Launched in 2020 as a dropship store on roughly $10K of founder capital, it reached about $700K in revenue in year one, $1.5M in year two and roughly $5M in year three, and was tracking toward a $10M target for FY2024.

Then revenue fell through the first half of 2024 more steeply than in any prior seasonal trough, producing the first loss-making months after more than two years of profitability. About 95% of marketing spend and 99% of website traffic ran through pay-per-click, and roughly half of all orders were dropshipped. In August 2024 the founder asked Armstrat to find out why revenue was falling and design the response.

What made it hard

  • The presenting problem was a symptom. Ad spend and paid traffic had risen, demand had not fallen and competitors were stable. The decline sat in conversion, and conversion sat in trust.
  • Reviews had turned against the brand on product condition, delivery delays, refunds, returns and service. Weaker reviews depressed conversion, which raised effective CPC and CPA, compressed margin and left less cash to fix the failures behind the reviews.
  • About half of orders were dropshipped, so units could not be inspected before sale, and QA could not be brought in house at domestic technical labor rates. Broken units traveled to an offshore team for repair and back again.
  • The window was tight. Armstrat scoped 90 days for audit and strategy, holiday urgency cut it to six weeks, and any change had to land before mid-November or wait until January.
  • Operations ran mainly on spreadsheets, an inherited ERP had stalled at the warehouse end, there was no CRM or retention program, and decisions sat at founder level without KRAs or formal reporting.
Close view of a games console against a vivid pink background.

How we worked

Armstrat worked from inside the business. The team interviewed every department, mapped the supply chain end to end and then stayed on under an interim management mandate, so the strategy became owned, running work rather than a report. The work was anchored to the commercial result the founder needed, revenue and margin, rather than to the size of the deliverable.

  1. 01

    Reframe the question first

    We moved the question from why sales were declining to why growth was capped. Seasonality would have recovered sales on its own, so a fix aimed only at the dip would have left the real constraint in place.

  2. 02

    Diagnose fast without cutting scope

    In three weeks we interviewed every department, the founders and suppliers, and ran SEO, CRO and supply chain audits alongside brand, competitor and customer analysis. An issue tree isolated five domains: customer experience, marketing and traffic, product and inventory, operations and fulfillment, and external factors.

  3. 03

    Rebuild growth, operations and leadership

    Growth: a new consumer-centric brand beside the existing one, 10 to 15% of budget moved from PPC to organic, and a fractional CMO. Operations: offshore QA and refurbishment, a phased exit from dropshipping, a completed ERP. Leadership: functional managers owning performance, KRAs and weekly reporting.

  4. 04

    Sequence by impact and effort

    Every recommendation was ranked by impact against effort into five tiers, from immediate actions to long-term opportunities. The order survived pressure to run everything in parallel and treated the holiday peak as a hard constraint: changes had to land before mid-November or wait until January.

  5. 05

    Stay in until it holds

    The strategy was delivered on September 18, 2024. By the end of November we had turned it into a project portfolio with programs, timelines, KRAs and a reporting cycle, and took an interim management mandate over governance, supply chain, budget and marketing while management ran daily operations.

The results

Measured against the outcomes agreed at the start.

10%
  • FY2024 closed at about $9M in revenue after the intervention, against a $10M target.
  • Net margin moved from loss-making months in July and August 2024 to a small surplus in September, improved through October and November, and closed the year at about 10%.
  • Diagnosis and strategy delivered in six weeks, on September 18, 2024, against an original 90-day scope.
  • Strategy turned into a project portfolio, with programs, timelines, KRAs and a reporting cycle, by the end of November 2024.
  • Six follow-on programs trace back to this strategy: the parallel brand, an offshore refurbishment facility, a custom ERP build, an operating model redesign, and the procurement and warehousing transformations.
  • Set the strategic basis for the two-year path from about $9M in FY2024 to about $16M in FY2026, roughly 1.8x.

What leaders can take from it

  • The presenting problem is rarely the problem. When sales fall despite higher ad spend and steady demand, it is a conversion problem, and in online retail, conversion problems are usually trust problems.
  • Reputation is an operating metric, not a marketing one. In a business built on paid acquisition, poor service is paid for twice: once in refunds and returns, and again in the cost of acquiring the next customer.
  • Compress a diagnosis in time, never in coverage. Cutting the audit from 90 days to six weeks was survivable. Cutting its scope would not have been, because the cause sat far from the symptom.

Questions about this work

Why are my online sales falling when ad spend is rising?

Usually because conversion has fallen, and in online retail conversion tracks trust. Here, ad spend and paid traffic were up, demand was steady and competitors were stable, yet revenue fell. Armstrat traced the decline to weaker reviews about product condition, delivery delays and refund handling, which raised effective acquisition costs and squeezed margin. The fix started with the service failures behind the reviews, not with more advertising.

Should a retailer with a damaged reputation rebrand?

Not outright if revenue cannot pause. Replacing the brand removes the cash flow that funds the repair. Armstrat recommended a parallel brand instead: build a new consumer-centric brand alongside the existing one, rebuild reputation there, and fix the operational causes underneath, from uninspected dropshipped stock to poor refund handling. The existing brand keeps trading while the new one earns trust.

Bring us the hard problem.

We agree the outcomes first, then work inside your business until they hold.